

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN
SOUTHERN DIVISION

In re

CITY OF DETROIT, MICHIGAN,

Debtor.

Bankr. No. 13-53846
Chapter 9
HON. STEVEN W. RHODES

JOHNATHAN AARON BROWN,

Appellant,

vs.

CITY OF DETROIT, MICHIGAN, et al.,

Appellees.

Case No. 14-cv-14919

HON. BERNARD A. FRIEDMAN

**OPINION AND ORDER GRANTING APPELLEE’S MOTION TO DISMISS
APPEAL AS EQUITABLY AND CONSTITUTIONALLY MOOT
PURSUANT TO FED. R. CIV. P. 12(b)(1)**

This matter is presently before the Court on the “Corrected Motion of Appellee the City of Detroit, Michigan for an order Pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(1) Dismissing Appeal as Equitably and Constitutionally Moot” [docket entry 27]. Appellant, Johnathan Brown, has not filed a response and the time for him to do so has expired. Pursuant to E.D. Mich. LR 7.1(f)(2), the Court shall decide this motion without a hearing.

I. Background

After experiencing decades of financial decline, the City filed the above-captioned Chapter 9 case (“Chapter 9 Case”) on July 18, 2013, in the United States Bankruptcy Court for the Eastern District of Michigan (“the Bankruptcy Court”). This Chapter 9 Case is the largest and most complex municipal bankruptcy in U.S. history. *See In re City of Detroit*, 504 B.R. 191, 281 (Bankr. E.D. Mich. 2013) (finding that, as of July 18, 2013, the City had over \$18 billion in escalating debt,

over 100,000 creditors, and hundreds of millions of dollars of negative cash flow). The importance of this Chapter 9 Case cannot be overstated. The Bankruptcy Court found that there existed a “service delivery insolvency” such that the City did not have “the resources to provide its residents with the basic police, fire and emergency medical services that its residents need for their basic health and safety.” *Id.* at 193.

Over the course of 16 months, the City engaged in negotiations and mediation with representatives of the vast majority of its creditors, which resulted in a series of intricate and carefully woven settlements with nearly all of the City’s stakeholder constituencies. These carefully woven settlements were encompassed in the City’s Eighth Amended Plan for the Adjustment of Debts of the City of Detroit (“the Plan”), which the Bankruptcy Court confirmed on November 12, 2014, in its Order Confirming Eighth Amended Plan for the Adjustment of Debts of the City of Detroit (“Confirmation Order”) after conducting a 24-day evidentiary hearing.

Impact of the Plan

Overall, the Plan (1) eliminates approximately \$7 billion in City liabilities; (2) frees approximately \$1.7 billion in revenue over a nine-year period for reinvestment into the City’s services, including directing funds to public safety services, blight remediation, and improvements to information technology and public transportation; and (3) provides for \$483 million in additional revenue and \$358 million in cost savings over the same time period.

Since the Plan became effective on December 10, 2014, the City has taken several steps to implement it. For example, the City (1) issued \$287.5 million in bonds under the Exit Facility; (2) issued \$632 million and \$88 million in New B and C Notes, respectively; (3) irrevocably transferred all DIA assets to a perpetual charitable trust; (4) debited excess interest from

all but five current ASF account holders subject to the ASF Recoupment program; (5) transferred interests of property pursuant to the Syncora Settlement and the FGIC/COP Settlement; and (6) implemented a two-year City budget. These actions provide only a brief glimpse into the numerous transactions that have occurred since the Plan's effective date.

The Instant Appeal

Claims brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 are classified as Other Unsecured Claims in Class 14 under the Plan. Allowed Other Unsecured Claims are impaired by the Plan, and holders of such claims will receive, in full satisfaction of such claims, their pro rata share of approximately \$16.48 million in New B Notes and \$4.12 million in Excess New B Notes. Consequently, holders of Class 14 Other Unsecured Claims are expected to recover approximately 10-13% of the value of their claims.

On February 19, 2014, appellant filed proof of claim number 1842 in the Chapter 9 Case, alleging a violation of § 1983 and seeking approximately \$143,437,440 in relief. Under the confirmed Plan, appellant's claim is impaired as described above. Accordingly, appellant objects to the Plan's treatment and classification of his § 1983 claim and asks the Court to vacate the Confirmation Order or, in the alternative, to "find that § 1983 claims must be excepted from discharge and that it remand the case back to the Bankruptcy Court so that it may use its discretion . . . to order the nondischargeability of § 1983 claims in the confirmation order." Appellant's Br. at 13.

II. Legal Standard

This Court has jurisdiction to hear appeals from "final judgments, orders, and decrees" of the Bankruptcy Court. 28 U.S.C. § 158(a)(1). The City has moved to dismiss this

appeal as equitably and constitutionally moot pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(1). *See Alexander v. Barnwell Cnty. Hosp.*, 498 B.R. 550, 557 (D.S.C. 2013) (finding that a motion to dismiss an appeal of an order confirming a bankruptcy plan as equitably or constitutionally moot is properly brought pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(1)).

III. Argument

A. The Doctrine of Equitable Mootness

The doctrine of equitable mootness applies “in appeals from bankruptcy confirmations in order to protect parties relying upon the successful confirmation of a bankruptcy plan from a drastic change after appeal.” *In re United Producers, Inc.*, 526 F.3d 942, 947 (6th Cir. 2008). The doctrine promotes fairness and protects “parties’ settled expectations and the ability of a debtor to emerge from bankruptcy.” *Id.* (citing *In re Ormet Corp.*, No. 2:04-CV-1151, 2005 WL 2000704, at *4 (S.D. Ohio Aug. 19, 2005)). Equitable mootness operates on the premise that a bankruptcy plan “once implemented, should be disturbed only for compelling reasons,” *City of Covington v. Covington Landing Ltd. P’ship*, 71 F.3d 1221, 1225 (6th Cir. 1995) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted), and is “grounded in the notion that, with the passage of time after a judgment in equity and implementation of that judgment, effective relief on appeal becomes impractical, imprudent, and therefore inequitable,” *In re United Producers, Inc.*, 526 F.3d at 947 (quoting *MAC Panel Co. v. Va. Panel Corp.*, 283 F.3d 622, 625 (4th Cir. 2002) (internal quotation marks omitted)). The equitable mootness doctrine therefore prevents a creditor, or any party for that matter, from overturning an order of the Bankruptcy Court—most often a confirmation order—if the requested relief would unravel complex and interwoven restructuring agreements or would require the undoing of transactions that are “extremely difficult to retract.” *In re Ormet Corp.*, 355 B.R. 37,

41 (S.D. Ohio 2006).

The doctrine of equitable mootness has been applied to a Chapter 9 bankruptcy appeal in only two cases—neither of which originated from courts within the Sixth Circuit. *See In re City of Vallejo, CA*, 551 F. App’x 339, 339 (9th Cir. 2013) (affirming the Bankruptcy Appellate Panel’s order dismissing Chapter 9 appeals as equitably moot); *Barnwell Cnty. Hosp.*, 498 B.R. 550, 559 (D.S.C. 2013) (dismissing Chapter 9 appeal as equitably and constitutionally moot). While it is true that “[e]quitable mootness is most commonly applied to avoid disturbing [Chapter 11] plans of reorganization,” *In re Fontainebleau Las Vegas Holdings, LLC*, 434 B.R. 716, 742 (S.D. Fla. 2010), this doctrine has been applied in other contexts, such as in Chapter 7 appeals, *see, e.g., In re McDonald*, 471 B.R. 194, 196-97 (E.D. Mich. 2012) (applying an equitable mootness analysis to a Chapter 7 appeal),¹ and in Chapter 11 liquidation proceedings, *see, e.g., In re BGI, Inc.*, 772 F.3d 102, 108-09 (2d Cir. 2014) (finding “no principled reason” why the doctrine of equitable mootness should not also apply in Chapter 11 liquidation proceedings where “substantial interests may counsel in favor of preventing tardy disruption of a duly developed, confirmed, and substantially consummated plan”).²

¹ *See also In re Shawnee Hills, Inc.*, 125 F. App’x 466, 469-70 (4th Cir. 2005) (applying equitable mootness doctrine to a Chapter 7 appeal); *In re Health Co. Int’l*, 136 F.3d 45, 48-49 (1st Cir. 1998) (same); *In re Fitzgerald*, 428 B.R. 872, 881-82 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 2010) (same); *In re Carr*, 321 B.R. 702, 706-07 (E.D. Va. 2005) (noting that the equitable mootness doctrine applies with equal force to a Chapter 7 liquidation of a bankruptcy estate as it does to a Chapter 11 reorganization).

² *See also In re President Casinos, Inc.*, 409 F. App’x 31, 31-32 (8th Cir. 2010) (affirming district court’s decision that Chapter 11 liquidation appeal was equitably moot); *In re Centrix Fin. LLC*, 355 F. App’x 199, 201-02 (10th Cir. 2009) (remanding Chapter 11 liquidation appeal to district court with instructions to apply equitable mootness analysis); *In re Superior Offshore Int’l, Inc.*, 591 F.3d 350, 353-54 (5th Cir. 2009) (conducting an equitable mootness analysis in a Chapter 11 liquidation appeal).

A survey of the case law discussing and applying the doctrine underscores the notion that equitable mootness “is not limited to appeals of orders confirming [Chapter 11] reorganization plans,”³ has “been applied in a variety of [bankruptcy chapter] contexts,”⁴ and should be “accorded broad reach.”⁵ As the case law illustrates, the doctrine is not concerned with the specific chapter under which the debtor’s case was brought. Rather, what matters is whether hearing the bankruptcy appeal could unravel the debtor’s plan and disturb the reliance interests created by it. Because the underlying equitable considerations of promoting finality and good faith reliance on a judgment applies with equal force to a Chapter 9 bankruptcy appeal, the Court sees no reason why the doctrine should not be applied to avoid disturbing a Chapter 9 plan of adjustment.

B. Application

The Sixth Circuit applies the equitable mootness doctrine using a three-part test: “(1) whether a stay has been obtained; (2) whether the plan has been ‘substantially consummated’; and (3) whether the relief requested would affect either the rights of parties not before the court or the success of the plan.” *In re United Producers*, 536 F.3d at 947-48 (internal citation omitted).⁶

1. Existence of a Stay

“When an appellant does not obtain a stay of the implementation of a confirmation

³ *In re PC Liquidation Corp.*, No. CV-06-1935(SJF), 2008 WL 199457, at *5 (E.D.N.Y. Jan. 17, 2008).

⁴ *In re Arcapita Bank B.S.C. (c)*, Nos. 13 Civ. 5755 (SAS) & 13 Civ. 5756(SAS), 2014 WL 46552, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 6, 2014).

⁵ *In re BGI, Inc.*, 772 F.3d at 109.

⁶ By failing to respond to the City’s motion to dismiss, appellant has conceded that the three factors of the equitable mootness doctrine weigh in favor of dismissing the instant appeal.

plan, the debtor will normally implement the plan and reliance interests will be created.” *In re United Producers, Inc.*, 526 F.3d at 948. The failure to obtain a stay will therefore “count against the appellant in determining whether an appeal should be denied on equitable mootness grounds,” *id.* (citing *In re Manges*, 29 F.3d at 1040), but is “not necessarily fatal to the appellant’s ability to proceed,” *City of Covington*, 71 F.3d at 1225-26.

Appellant did not obtain, let alone seek, a stay of the Confirmation Order. “A stay not sought, and a stay sought and denied, lead equally to the implementation of the plan of reorganization.” *United Producers, Inc.*, 526 F.3d at 948. Accordingly, appellant’s failure to obtain a stay weighs in favor of granting the City’s motion to dismiss.

2. Substantial Consummation

The Bankruptcy Code defines “substantial consummation” as:

(A) transfer of all or substantially all of the property proposed by the plan to be transferred; (B) assumption by the debtor or by the successor to the debtor under the plan of the business or of the management of all or substantially all of the property dealt with by the plan; and (c) commencement of distribution under the plan.

11 U.S.C. § 1101(2). Although the definition of “substantial consummation” is ordinarily used as a statutory measure “to determine whether a bankruptcy court may modify or amend a [Chapter 11] reorganization plan, *In re United Producers*, 526 F.3d at 948 (citing § 1127), “[t]he standard has been adopted in the equitable mootness analysis to determine the extent to which the plan has progressed,” *Id.* (citing *In re Manges*, 29 F.3d at 1040-41). “If a plan has been substantially consummated there is a greater likelihood that overturning the confirmation plan will have adverse effects on the success of the plan and on third parties.” *Id.* This Chapter 11 standard therefore serves as a “yardstick . . . as to when finality concerns and the reliance interests of third parties upon

the plan as effectuated have become paramount to a resolution of the dispute between the parties on appeal.” *In re Manges*, 29 F.3d at 1040-41.

The City argues that the Plan has been substantially consummated and notes numerous major transfers and transactions that have been effectuated pursuant to the Plan, including (1) the State of Michigan’s disbursement of \$194.8 million to the City’s Retirement Systems; (2) the DIA’s and other philanthropic organizations’ disbursement of \$23 million to the Retirement Systems; (3) the City’s issuance of \$287.5 million in Financial Recovery Bonds, \$632 million in New B Notes, and \$88 million in New C Notes; (4) the City’s irrevocable transfer of its right, title, and interest in DIA assets to a perpetual charitable trust; (5) the Retirement Systems’ implementation of pension plan modifications, including pension and COLA reductions and ASF Recoupment; and (6) the substantial completion of ASF Recoupment of current account holders, which has resulted in \$58.5 million in recaptured funds. *See Appellee’s Mot.* at 29-32. The City and other entities have also resumed or initiated management of substantially all of the property dealt with by the Plan, as demonstrated by (1) Kevyn D. Orr’s resignation as Emergency Manager, which restored day-to-day management of the City to the Mayor and City Council; (2) Governor Richard D. Snyder’s decision to remove the City from financial emergency status and end receivership; (3) the City’s implementation of \$1.7 billion in Reinvestment Initiatives, of which \$8.4 million went to the Detroit Police Department, \$3.8 million to the Detroit Fire Department, \$3.5 million for blight remediation, and \$1.9 million to the City’s Income Tax Division to upgrade information technology; (4) the establishment of the Great Lakes Water Authority and two VEBAs to provide healthcare benefits to City retirees; and (5) appointment of the Michigan Financial Review Commission to review the City’s finances. *See id.* at 32-34. Finally, the City notes that it

has substantially completed numerous payments and distributions under the Plan, including (1) \$21 million in New B Notes for distribution to holders of Class 14 claims; (2) \$55 million in cash to holders of allowed Class 7 claims; (3) \$17 million in New B Notes for distribution to holders of allowed Limited Tax General Obligation Bond Claims; (4) \$280 million in Restructured UTGO Bonds to holders of allowed Class 8 Claims; (5) \$88 million in New C Notes to the COP Trustee for the benefit of settling claims with Class 9 claimants; and (6) \$493 million in New B Notes to the VEBAAs to satisfy Class 12 claims. *See id.* 35-36.

As these many transfers, transactions, and actions demonstrate, implementation of the Plan has been set into motion and has been substantially consummated. Since the effective date, pensions have been reduced, COLAs have been eliminated, ASF Recoupment has recaptured nearly all diverted funds from current ASF account holders, ASF Recoupment for non-current ASF account holders has taken effect by further adjusting GRS pensions, and New B Notes have been distributed to holders of Class 14 claims. Thus, this factor weighs in favor of granting the City's motion to dismiss.

3. Rights of Third Parties and Success of the Plan

“Even when a plan has been substantially consummated, it is ‘not necessarily . . . impossible or inequitable for an appellate court to grant effective relief.’” *In re United Producers, Inc.*, 526 F.3d at 949 (quoting *In re Manges*, 29 F.3d at 1042-43). This is because the “most important factor [a] court must consider is ‘whether the relief requested would affect either the rights of parties not before the court or the success of the plan.’” *Id.* (quoting *In re Am. HomePatient, Inc.*, 420 F.3d 559, 564 (6th Cir. 2005)). This question “‘require[s] a case-by-case judgment regarding[] the feasibility or futility of effective relief should a litigant prevail.’” *Id.* (quoting *In re AOV Indus.*,

Inc., 792 F.2d 1140, 1147-48 (D.C. Cir. 1986)). In assessing the feasibility of granting relief, the court must “consider[] the nature of the relief requested and whether it amounts to a piecemeal revision of the plan or a wholesale rewriting of it.” *Id.* (citing *In re Manges*, 29 F.3d at 1042) (“We must evaluate [actions taken pursuant to the Plan], many of which appear irreversible, against the backdrop of the relief sought—nothing less than a wholesale annihilation of the Plan.”). Essentially, the Court must decide whether appellant presents a “plausible argument that the implementation of [his] suggested changes to the confirmation plan would not require any of the actions undertaken pursuant to the plan to be reversed.” *In re United Producers, Inc.*, 526 F.3d at 950.

Appellant’s requested relief of having this Court “vacate” the Confirmation Order would undoubtedly “produce a ‘perverse’ outcome—‘chaos in the bankruptcy court’ from a plan in tatters and/or significant ‘injury to third parties.’” *In re Semcrude, L.P.*, 728 F.3d 314, 320 (3d Cir. 2013) (quoting *In re Phila. Newspapers, LLC*, 690 F.3d 161, 168 (3d Cir. 2012)). The relief appellant requests—sending the City back to square one—would require “nothing less than a wholesale annihilation of the Plan.” *In re Manges*, 29 F.3d at 1043. Any suggestion to the contrary simply cannot be credited.

Vacating the entire Confirmation Order would unravel the Grand Bargain, which could cause (1) the State to commence measures to recover the State Contribution and (2) the DIA Funding Parties to withhold hundreds of millions of dollars in funding not yet disbursed to the City. Further, if the City were required to fully satisfy its prepetition § 1983 obligations, including appellant’s \$143 million claim, the City would be rendered incapable of (1) satisfying its obligations to creditors under the Plan and (2) implementing \$1.7 billion in Reinvestment Initiatives. In a Plan described by Martha E.M. Kopacz, the court-appointed independent feasibility expert, as having

“little space remaining on the continuum of reasonableness,” where “[i]t is not realistic or prudent to believe that the City could take on any additional plan obligations and remain within the continuum . . . necessary to establish feasibility,” appellant’s requested relief clearly would hinder the success of the Plan. Tr. of 11/7/2014 Hr’g at 54:13-14.

Further, reversing the Plan would negatively affect countless third parties who have justifiably relied on the Plan. Equitable mootness has particular force when “[r]eversal of the Confirmation Order . . . would require the invalidation of thousands of good-faith transfers made pursuant to the Plan,” *In re Eagle-Picher Indus., Inc.*, 172 F.3d 48 (6th Cir. 1998), and “unraveling the plan ‘would work incalculable inequity to many thousands of innocent third parties who have extended credit, settled claims, relinquished collateral and transferred or acquired property in legitimate reliance on the unstayed order of confirmation,’” *In re United Producers, Inc.*, 526 F.3d at 951 (quoting *In re Public Serv. Co.*, 963 F.2d 469, 475 (1st Cir. 1992)). This reliance interest is heightened when, as here, the plan “reflects a highly integrated settlement among various constituencies.” *HNRC Dissolution, Co.*, No. Civ.A.04-158 HRW, 2005 WL 1972592, at *9 (E.D. Ky. Aug. 16, 2005).

The record from the Bankruptcy Court reveals that appellant’s requested relief would negatively affect the success of the Plan and harm innocent third parties who have come to rely upon the Plan. Thus, the third factor of the equitable mootness analysis weighs in favor of granting the City’s motion to dismiss.

IV. Conclusion

All three factors of the equitable mootness analysis weigh in favor of dismissing

appellant's appeal as moot: appellant did not obtain a stay; the confirmed Plan has been substantially consummated; and reversal of the Plan would adversely impact third parties and the success of the Plan. Having concluded that this appeal is equitably moot, the Court finds it unnecessary to address the City's secondary argument that the appeal is also constitutionally moot. Accordingly,

IT IS ORDERED that the "Corrected Motion of Appellee the City of Detroit, Michigan for an order Pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(1) Dismissing Appeal as Equitably and Constitutionally Moot" [docket entry 27] is granted. This appeal is dismissed as equitably moot.

S/ Bernard A. Friedman _____
BERNARD A. FRIEDMAN
SENIOR UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

Dated: September 29, 2015
Detroit, Michigan